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Abstract
Richard Rorty wrote on many occasions that called the linguistic turn was an attempt 
to keep philosophy an armchair discipline. “The idea - he said - was to mark off a space 
for a priori knowledge into which neither sociology nor history nor art nor natural 
science could intrude”. Linguistic analysis, in short, has become with the passing of 
time a sort of first philosophy, aimed at replacing metaphysics (which the founding 
fathers of logical positivism gave up for dead). Two opposite conceptions of language 
are at stake here. The first says that language is something self-explanatory which, in 
turn, explains everything else. This means postulating type A objects, i.e. unexplained 
explainers in terms of which type B objects - the explananda - can be accounted. The 
second conception claims, instead, that there is no actual distinction between type A 
and type B objects. All objects are on a par, but in a particular sense. Rorty resorts in 
fact to the Quinean-flavored simile of the net and its nodes.
Rorty’s is an intelligent move. Since there is no longer ineffability and unavailability, 
all problems seem to be solved. Is this true? We have good motives to be suspicious 
because, after all, Immanuel Kant must have adopted that kind of model for some 
reason, and Ludwig Wittgenstein himself struggled with the old problem of the gap 
between reality itself and our representations of it. Rorty proclaims his faith in holism. 
In contrast to the assumption that there can be entities which are what they are 
totally independent of all relations between them, a Davidsonian (and also Quinean) 
holism claims that “all entities are merely nodes in a net of relations”, which gives us 
a picture of the following kind: “No intrinsically simple objects, no pictures, and no 
language. For if analysis could not end with such objects, then whether a sentence 
has sense would depend upon whether another sentence were true - the sentence 
which specifies that two simpler objects making up a composite stand in the relevant 
compositional relationship”. 
The great issue at stake here is the relation between ontology and epistemology. 
Most interpreters would answer that such a distinction is untenable in Wittgenstein’s 
thought, and in particular if we take into account the second phase of his philosophical 
parabola. But, notwithstanding this common opinion, we are confronted with a great 
problem, namely, that of determining what really is the reference framework about 
which Wittgenstein so often talks, and which is supposed to be shared by all human 
beings as such. He frequently says in his works that skepticism raises doubts when no 
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questions can be asked, while Monk correctly describes his endeavor in On Certainty 
as one aimed at showing “The point at which doubt becomes senseless”.
The question to be asked is, obviously, the following: What does this mean? Wittgenstein 
is right when he says that some questions cannot be asked because they do not even 
make sense, but in my view we may interpret him in a way different from the traditional 
ones that have been thus far put forward. We may accept Wittgenstein’s statement 
that the existence of the world, for instance, cannot meaningfully be questioned. But 
this means, in turn, that the linguistic games cannot go on forever. Sooner or later we 
run into a “hard rock” which is ultimately non-linguistic and whose existence is the 
original fact from which everything else stems, including language, linguistic games, 
conceptual schemes, social practices, etc. Everything, in sum, can be questioned, but 
nature. And when someone does question it, like the pupil mentioned in On Certainty, 
who will not let anything be explained to him by his teacher, for he continuously 
interrupts him with doubts concerning the existence of things, we are somehow 
forced to answer his questions as Wittgenstein’s teacher does: “Stop interrupting me 
and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”.
Keywords: Language; Social practices; Metaphysics; Linguistic Turn; Reality; Holism
In a paper of his, Richard Rorty wrote that what Gustav Bergmann called the linguistic 
turn “was a rather desperate attempt to keep philosophy an armchair discipline. The 
idea was to mark off a space for a priori knowledge into which neither sociology nor 
history nor art nor natural science could intrude”.1 This, of course, would explain well 
enough why linguistic analysis has become with the passing of time a sort of first 
philosophy, aimed at replacing just that metaphysics which the founding fathers of 
logical positivism gave up for dead. Rorty then claims that what Ian Hacking has called 
“the death of meaning”, i.e. the end of any attempt to make language a transcendental 
topic, cleared the way towards a more naturalistic way of conceiving language itself. 
Essentially - he says - we moved from Frege and the early Wittgenstein, who are the 
philosophers primarily responsible for holding the idea that language can be defined 
as “a clearly shared structure”, to the second Wittgenstein (later on followed by Quine, 
Davidson and Rorty himself)2 who instead gave up this idea.
To clarify the issue, I can thus claim that two opposite conceptions of language are 
at stake here. The first says that (i) language is something self-explanatory which, in 
turn, explains everything else. This means postulating type A objects, i.e. unexplained 
explainers like Platonic forms, Kantian categories, Russellian logical objects, in terms 
of which type B objects - the explananda - can be accounted. The second conception 
1 R. Rorty, “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language”, in C. Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 337-357. The article originally appeared in Rorty's Essays on 
Heidegger and Others, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge, 1990. 
2 As a matter of fact Rorty addresses Heidegger’s thought too, but I will not take Heidegger into account in this paper.
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claims, instead, that (ii) there is no actual distinction between type A and type B 
objects. All objects are on a par, but in a very special sense. Rorty resorts in fact to the 
Quinean-flavored simile of the net and its nodes. 
If we want to avoid the self-referential problem constantly faced by those who postulate 
a distinction between type A and type B objects3, then it is necessary - Rorty goes 
on - to change the whole picture. Since according to him “the Tractarian distinction 
between the available and effable world and the unavailable and ineffable substance 
of the world” is wrong (and - I would like to add - the Kantian distinction between 
the available and effable phenomena and the unavailable and ineffable noumena has 
serious shortcomings, too), all we have to do is to give up altogether the distinction.
Rorty’s is a nice move indeed. Since there is no longer ineffability and unavailability, all 
problems seem to be solved. But... is this true? We have good motives to be suspicious 
here because, after all, Immanuel Kant must have adopted that kind of model for 
some reason, and Ludwig Wittgenstein himself struggled, up to the end of his life,4 
with the old problem of the gap between reality itself and our representations of it. 
Let us then check the Davidson-style solution that Rorty proposes.
At this point, in fact, Rorty proclaims his faith in holism. In contrast to the assumption 
that there can be entities which are what they are totally independent of all relations 
between them, a Davidsonian (and also Quinean) holism claims that “all entities are 
merely nodes in a net of relations”, which gives us a picture of the following kind: “No 
intrinsically simple objects, no pictures, and no language. For if analysis could not 
end with such objects, then whether a sentence has sense would depend, horribile 
dictu, upon whether another sentence were true - the sentence which specifies 
that two simpler objects making up a composite stand in the relevant compositional 
relationship. But when one asks what would be so horrible about that, [the first] 
Wittgenstein has no obvious answer.” 5
So let us ask ourselves: What is so horrible about that, after all? In my view the 
“horribleness” of such a situation is due to the fact that, despite all the differences 
that Rorty finds between the first and the second Wittgenstein, and between himself 
and the orthodox analytic philosophy, even in his vision, our language becomes not 
only the arbiter of truth, but also the sole component of reality. And, by adopting that 
picture, we are back, once again, to the old idealist view that human beings cannot 
step out of their thought, the only difference being that “thought” must be replaced 
by “language”.
3 This is Rorty’s own formulation of the aforementioned referential problem: “If we claim that no entity is available which 
remains unrelated by a form of relationship which cannot hold between unaided type B entities, then we have problems about 
the availability of the type A entities we postulate to lend the necessary aid.” (Ibid., p. 342).
4 See Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969. 
5 Ibid., p. 343.
M. Marsonet - rorty on Language and sociaL Practices   33
Obviously, this is not the interpretation that Rorty gives us of his own stance. In his 
opinion, he - together with other contemporary thinkers like Quine and Davidson - 
overcame the linguistic turn by adopting a sort of “conditions free” view of reality. 
“Availability - he claims - requires being related by something other than the relata 
themselves. We have opened up the question of why we ever thought that there 
was a problem about availability in the first place. We have thereby questioned the 
need for philosophy, insofar as philosophy is thought of as the study of conditions of 
availability.” But can availability be so easily discarded? Rorty adds that we must turn 
to “naturalism”, i.e. the view that anything might have been otherwise, that there can 
be no “conditionless conditions”.
The solution that he proposes thus relies on the standard interpretation of the second 
Wittgenstein, who “dropped the idea of finding nonempirical conditions for the 
possibility of linguistic description.” But what does the second Wittgenstein mean by 
empirical? This is by no means clear, despite the opinion of many interpreters of the 
Austrian philosopher’s writings. Rorty goes on saying that “He [the later Wittgenstein] 
became reconciled to the idea that whether a sentence had sense did indeed depend 
upon whether another sentence was true - a sentence about the social practices of the 
people who used the marks and noises which were the components of the sentence”. 
This is extremely interesting, but does it really reflect what the later Wittgenstein said?
The fact is that Wittgenstein’s texts do not lend themselves to a clear and 
straightforward interpretation such as the one endorsed by Rorty. I would like to 
single out, in this respect, a beautiful passage drawn from On Certainty, 6 where 
Wittgenstein addresses the nature of our reference framework dealing with Moore’s 
solution to the skeptical problem: “It might be imagined that some propositions, of 
the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for 
such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation 
altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of my thoughts may 
shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the 
shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other 
(...) And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or 
only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited (...) The truths which Moore says he knows, are such 
as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them”.
Here we are, in my opinion, at the hard bottom of the later Wittgenstein’s thought, 
a hard bottom which he reached just a few months before his death. What kind of 
sense can we make of Wittgenstein’s remarks? An orthodox Wittgensteinian would 
most likely say that, in this context, our philosopher is dealing with the problem of the 
6 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, cit., 96-99, p. 15e.
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relations among: (1) propositions, (ii) beliefs, and (iii) the framework within which we 
give grounds for our beliefs.7 But let us explore instead an alternative path, without 
worrying too much about the faithfulness of our interpretation to Wittgenstein’s texts 
and their orthodox gloss.
The great issue at stake here is, in my view, the relation between ontology and 
epistemology. True, most interpreters would answer that such a distinction is untenable 
in Wittgenstein’s thought, and in particular if we take into account the second phase 
of his philosophical parabola. But, notwithstanding this common opinion, I think we 
are confronted with a great problem, namely, that of determining what really is the 
reference framework about which Wittgenstein so often talks, and which is supposed 
to be shared by all human beings qua human beings. He frequently says in his works 
that skepticism raises doubts when no questions can be asked, while Monk correctly 
describes his endeavor in On Certainty as one aimed at showing “The point at which 
doubt becomes senseless”.8
But how can language - now taken to be a set of social practices - guarantee us against 
skepticism? Wittgenstein at this point resorts to the notion of “language game”, saying 
that there is no language game in which questions concerning the reality of the world 
can be asked. Wittgenstein is right in this respect, but why so? My claim is that we need 
to go a step further, gearing any linguistic game to something else (which, however, is 
not ontologically separated from the language game itself). If we take the expression 
“when no questions can be asked”, are we challenging: (i) our scheme of reference, 
(ii) a reality as it is and could not be otherwise, or (iii) both, because they are just the 
same thing?
Let us go back to Wittgenstein’s simile of the river-bed. At the beginning he makes 
a move which is purely linguistic, claiming that (a) some (empirical) propositions 
hardened and began to function as “channels” for (b) other (empirical as well) 
propositions that remain fluid. The purpose of both (a) and (b) type propositions is to 
furnish a world-picture that, however, might be part of a “mythology”. Suppose that 
the hardened (a) type propositions are more or less the river-bed, while the fluid (b) 
type propositions are the waters which are supposed to flow within the river-bed. 
The border line is not so clearly defined, just as it happens with the river-bed and the 
waters, but in any event we can always trace some kind of distinction.
The (a) type propositions are thus similar to the bank of the river that consists of 
hard rock, while the (b) type propositions are like the waters that flow. Our referential 
framework consists essentially of (a) type propositions, whose validity is self-
explanatory and are such that they are not touched by any skeptical doubt: to question 
7 See for instance R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius, Jonathan Cape, London, 1990, ch. 26, pp. 569-575.
8 R. Monk, Ibid., p. 578.
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them, in fact, is tantamount to question our reference framework. Those (a) type 
propositions form what we may define as the fundamental language game, on which 
everything else rests. And who - we might ask - established this fundamental language 
game? Wittgenstein’s answer would most likely be that language itself established 
it. But, this time, language is no more an abstract and Platonic structure shared by 
all members of mankind. It is, rather, a set of social practices that has no ultimate 
meaning beyond itself.
On this late Wittgensteinian picture Rorty relies to build his own picture, which is in 
turn much indebted to Quine’s and Davidson’s conceptions. However, it is clear that 
the Wittgensteinian picture does not work very well if we take it at its face value. A 
whole set of questions comes to mind: (1) Does this picture imply that nature is only 
a set of social practices, and that, furthermore, it is only socially constructed? (2) Do 
we build the laws of nature socially? (3) Do we construct the ultimate components 
of reality science is looking for socially? And (4) is the second Wittgenstein arbitrarily 
applying the notion of “social practice” to the whole of nature? Such a move seems 
to me totally unwarranted (although being no doubt fascinating from a purely 
philosophical point of view, as Rorty and other thinkers have shown). At this point we 
can see that, most likely, Rorty is wrong in dismissing the following intuition of the 
early Wittgenstein as it is contained in the Tractatus: “If the world had no substance, 
then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition 
was true. In that case we could not sketch out any picture of the world”.9 
Maybe Wittgenstein, especially in the Tractatus, used expressions like “substance of 
the world” in a rather deceptive way, but I take the basic preoccupation expressed in 
the aforementioned quotation as a completely justified one.
It is easy to verify that Rorty’s view has at least one serious shortcoming. Take his 
picture of “reality” conceived of as a net formed by nodes whose existence is only 
given by their being in relation to each other. It is clear that (a) the nodes have sense 
only within the net, but it is by no means less clear that (b) the net has sense only in 
so far it is formed by single nodes. The absence of even one of these nodes would 
make the net just different from what it is. Rorty (along with Davidson) insists on the 
notion of “relation”, as if this notion could explain everything. “Davidson’s account of 
human linguistic behavior - Rorty claims - takes for granted, as the later Wittgenstein 
also did, that there are no linguistic entities which are intrinsically relationless.” But - I 
claim - the ontological structure of reality is not given only by the relations between 
entities. Besides being related to one another, the nodes of the net must be: their 
natural existence is at least as important as their relatedeness and, as a matter of fact, 
something must first exist in order to be related to something else. In other words, 
we could never make up a net from nothing: the net is bound to be made of some 
9 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, 2.0211-2.0212.
36     acadeMicus - internationaL scientific JournaL
stuff. And it is worth noticing that we have neither empirical nor philosophical reasons 
to deny that those nodes are precisely the ultimate constituents of reality which 
contemporary physicists are looking for. 
I think that Rorty’s account, although intriguing from the philosophical point of view, 
is too limited: it dissolves reality within a concept of “social practice” that is too broad 
and loose to explain anything. Rorty might obviously answer that we do not need 
explanations because there is nothing to be explained, but this vision is hardly tenable. 
The second Wittgenstein, whom he considers as his mentor, never claimed that there 
is nothing to be explained. Maybe he said that we cannot explain everything we wish 
to, but this is a completely different story.
As Rorty himself recognizes, his account of reality is much indebted not only to the later 
Wittgenstein, but also to Donald Davidson’s refusal to distinguish between conceptual 
schemes and their contents, a move which ultimately led Davidson to abandon the 
notion of “conceptual scheme” altogether. I believe that Davidson’s refusal is - to a 
certain extent - justified, although my reasons for claiming this are certainly different 
from the ones he puts forward. Let us summarize the situation in a quite sketchy 
manner.
If (1) we qua human beings are just part of nature, then (2) our conceptual schemes 
are a part of nature, too. We cannot introduce a wedge between ourselves and nature, 
otherwise we are bound to repeat the Kantian move of assuming a priori factors that 
cannot be accounted for from a naturalistic point of view. It follows, then, that (3) 
there are no a priori elements in our mind, where by a priori elements I mean some 
unexplained factors which would allow human beings - and only them - to play a 
creative role in the construction of nature itself. The best thing to do, at this point, is 
(4) to conceive of our conceptual schemes as physical processes that reflect reality to 
some extent. And (5) this means, in turn, that our image of reality is not something 
separate and independent of reality itself; therefore, there is a continuum between our 
conceptual scheme and reality, in the sense that our conceptual scheme is just one of 
the forms through which reality happens to be. It follows (6) that the debates realism/
anti-realism, and idealism/materialism, as they usually take place in philosophy, even 
up to the present, make little sense. In fact we are just part of a complex physical 
process, and there is no discontinuity between nature and our mind which is also 
a part of it. But (7) at this point the Kantian distinction between “phenomena” and 
“noumena” makes little sense, too. Since there is only one nature, we are also bound 
to admit that there is only one ontology. Then (8) Davidson’s denial of the distinction 
scheme-content is vindicated.
The question to be asked is, obviously, the following: What does this mean? Notice 
that my previous considerations by no means imply an endorsement of a Davidsonian 
M. Marsonet - rorty on Language and sociaL Practices   37
stance: what I am saying is that thought, language, and mind are just parte of one 
“thing”, and this thing I call nature. So Wittgenstein is right when he says that some 
questions cannot be asked because they do not even make sense, but in my view 
we may interpret him in a way different from the traditional ones that have been 
thus far put forward.10 We may accept Wittgenstein’s statement that the existence 
of the world, for instance, cannot meaningfully be questioned. But this means, in 
turn, that the linguistic games cannot go on forever. Sooner or later we run into a 
“hard rock” which is ultimately non-linguistic and whose existence is the original fact 
from which everything else stems, including language, linguistic games, conceptual 
schemes, social practices, and whatever one wants to name. Everything, in sum, can be 
questioned, but nature. And when someone does question it, like the pupil mentioned 
in On Certainty,11 who will not let anything be explained to him by his teacher, for 
he continuously interrupts him with doubts concerning the existence of things, we 
are somehow forced to answer his questions as Wittgenstein’s teacher does: “Stop 
interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”.
Obviously, I am aware of the fact that neither the orthodox Wittgensteinians nor Rorty 
are likely to accept what I said thus far. But it should also be clear that my unfaithfulness 
to the orthodox gloss of Wittgenstein’s texts is here far less important than the basic 
point I want to make. And this basic point may be summarized as follows. In order for 
a picture of the world to exist, there must be something to be pictured, and in order 
for a reference framework to exist, there must be something this framework matches. 
Otherwise, we are - as Rorty claims - somehow suspended in a void in which the fact 
that a sentence has sense depends upon whether another sentence is true, and this 
other sentence is only about “the social practices of the people who use the marks 
and the noises which are the components of the sentence.” It seems to me that this 
is just an elegant attempt to skip philosophical problems which arise spontaneously 
in any kind of social practice, and it is on such attempt, in fact, that Rorty bases his 
popular thesis of the alleged “end of philosophy”.
But things, of course, cannot be that simple. Today we see that many metaphysical 
issues with which most philosophers no longer cope with are, instead, taken up 
by scientists. They often express their astonishment when realizing to what extent 
contemporary philosophy has become “minimalistic”, in the sense of being concerned 
only with small and technical details regarding linguistic usage.12 Is it Wittgenstein’s 
fault, as the physicist Stephen Hawking has suggested? The answer is “yes” if we stick 
to Richard Rorty’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. The answer is instead “no”, if we are 
bold enough to overcome the orthodox gloss.
10 Notice that, in this context, I do not mean to be “faithful” to any particular interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought.
11 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, cit., 310, p. 40e.
12 The examples are rather numerous. Here I will quote only two books: S. Hawking, A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang 
to Black Holes, Bantam Books, New York, 1988; and S. Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, Pantheon Books, New York, 1992.
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